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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-CoLLEC'IIIVE BARGAINING CoNTRACTSIMPLIED PowER TO BARGAIN WITH A LABOR UNION-Under the Ohio Constitution the City of Cleveland had the power to own and operate a street
railway system. The city charter authorized the Transit Board to supervise,
manage and control the transit system. The authorization included the power
to establish wages and working conditions in accordance with the provisions of
the charter. An action for a declaratory judgment was brought in order to
determine whether the board had the power to contract with a union as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the transit system employees, or the power to contract with a union for arbitration of disputes, and finally, whether the board
had the power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union.
Held, the Transit Board had no express power, nor could one be implied, to
contract with any union. City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America,
30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945).
The court in the principal case follows well established principles of municipal law in dealing with a problem which arises from any attempt to apply
equally well established principles of labor law to government employees. The
first two issues certified to the court may be easily disposed of by an examination of the powers of municipal authorities. Although the defendant union
relied upon the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions,
the court discards the distinction because the question is not one of liability upon
an effective contract, but rather is an issue as to the existence of a power to
contract. 1 Whatever the effect of the distinction as to other phases of law, it
has none on the extent of a municipality's power to contract.2 Moreover, an
employee of a municipally owned utility is not any less a government employee merely because his labor is used in a proprietary function of the city. The
court finds no implied power in the board to designate a union as the sole bargaining agent of the transit employees because it would result in discrimination
against employees not represented by a union. 3 The attempt to establish a board

1 Principal case at 405. In Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, (Cal. Super. Ct.
1944) 13 LW 2124, the court relied upon the proprietary-governmental distinction
in upholding a collective bargaining agreement between the city and a labor union.
The court also applied the California Labor Code to municipal employees. For a
criticism of the decision see MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN AcnoN, National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 374 (1945).
2 6 McQu1LLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d ed., § 2652 (1937). See also,
PoWER OF MuNICIPALITIES TO ENTER INTO LABOR UNION CoNTRACTs, Report No.
76, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 21 (1941).
3 Principal case at 407. The court adopts the reasoning expressed in Drake
Bakeries Inc. v. Bowles, 31 O.N.P. (N.S.) 425 (1934). The court in the principal
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of arbitration is obviously in conflict with the fundamental principle that delegations of legislative power are invalid. 4 The Transit Board is a public body, subject to regulation in the public interest; any contract to make the determination
of an arbitration binding upon the board is invalid as a surrender of power to a
body without official sanction. 5 In view of the strict limitations upon implied
powers, it would appear that without reference to the obstacle of delegation of
legislative power, the contract establishing a board of arbitration would be invalid.6 It is difficult to find a power to so contract as an incident of the express
authority of the board, or as indispensable to the purposes of the municipality.
The third issue certified to the court, that is, the power to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement, causes more difficulty. It is possible to imagine a situation where such an agreement would not operate as a restraint upon the board's
exercise of discretion, nor as a delegation of power, nor as discrimination against
other city employees. But, "collective bargaining connotes more than the mere
holding of conferences." 7 The very purpose of such bargaining is to reach an
agreement acceptable to both parties; such an objective necessarily results in
some delegation of authority to the union, or in some influence upon the board's
exercise of its authority. The obstacle to this attempt to contract becomes insurmountable when the board is confronted with the fact that here again it is
relying upon an implied power. 8 The board's control of the transit system is
exercised by resolution, not by contract with a labor union. 9 The question as to
the validity of an express power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union remains unanswered, but not uncontroverted. 10
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case interprets the Ohio law as giving no right to establish an exclusive bargaining
agent without the consent of all employees to be represented; this is in view of the
fact that Ohio has no labor refations act, and the federal statutes do not cover municipal
employees.
4
1 McQu1LLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., §§ 393, 394, and 395
(1940).
5
8 OHIO JuR. § 218 (1930).
6
In Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72 at 79, 5 N.E. (2d) 624
(1937), it is pointed out that implied powers are found only where they make express
powers effective or enforceable, or where they are indispensable to the objects or purposes of the municipality.
7
PowER OF MUNICIPALITIES TO ENTER INTO LABOR UNION CoNTRACTS, Report
No. 76, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, at 15.
8
See note 6, supra.
9
Principal case at 41 I.
10
Although no court of last resort has as yet passed on the question of a municipality's power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, it is doubtful that this
situation will long last. To the writer's knowledge there have been four decisions
rendered by lower courts covering the problem: the principal case; Nutter v. City of
Santa Monica, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1944) 13 LW 2124; Mugford v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, (Baltimore City Circuit Ct. 1944), 13 LW 2245, in which the
court recognized a power in the municipality to bargain with a union, but held that
there was no power to give the union preference over others; and Chapin v. Board of
Education of Peoria, 5 MuNI. L. J. 24 (1939), which held that the Board of Education did not have the power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the
union where it was attempted to establish a closed shop.

